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Abstract
The thesis compared the likelihood of taking risks in dyads and individuals in
varying situations. Patterns of risky decision making were examined in the standard risky
choice task and a novel risk management task. The relative successes of two theories of
risky decision making were assessed: Prospect Theory emphasizes perceptual and
psychophysical processes, whereas Security-Potential/Aspiration Level Theory
emphasizes dispositional and motivational processes. The thesis also examined dyads’
decision behavior in light of competing social influence perspectives regarding risky
versus cautious shifts and group polarization.
Participants, as individuals or as part of a dyad, made decisions in 23 trials about
hypothetical two-outcome monetary gambles in one of two different tasks. Risky choice
involved making choices between two given 50-50 lotteries which varied in riskiness
(i.e., outcome variability), whereas risk management required actively manipulating an
existing 50-50 risk by changing outcome values. The 23 trials were equivalent across
tasks. Dyad participants communicated via an instant messenger program, while viewing
the same lotteries on different computers. Data on risk preferences across gain and loss
domains were analyzed using a mixed factorial ANOVA design.
Consistent with Prospect Theory value function predictions, the risky choice task
led to risk averse preferences for gains and risk seeking preferences for losses, though
risk seeking was weak. Consistent with SP/A theory predictions, the risk management
task led to overall risk averse preferences, with movement toward risk taking for gains.
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In addition, there was some evidence of social influences in that dyads tended to be more
conservative than individuals in their decision behavior when dealing with undesirable
outcomes. Thus, a cautious shift was observed, but only for lotteries involving
guaranteed losses. This could not be explained by group polarization.
Each of the theories received some support, but none of them could explain all of
the findings. Recommendations were made to give greater attention to defining and
measuring risk attitudes and dispositions, and to continue exploring differences in
decision situations and social settings to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of
risky decision making processes. Findings here suggest the need for an overarching
theory that can account for a wide variety of influences. A dual processes approach was
recommended as one promising avenue. Social and situational influences may prove an
essential part of understanding risky decision making in real life contexts.
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Introduction
In real life decision making, individuals often make decisions with another
person. Be it a spouse, a parent, a sibling, a friend, a colleague, dyad decision making is
common. Much attention has been devoted to studying dyadic interactions and behavior
in a variety of contexts. The game theory framework provides insight into human
cooperative and competitive tendencies in any of a variety of strategic situations with
well-defined rules (e.g., Camerer, 2003). The medical decision making literature
addresses issues of shared decision making typically between a patient and his or her
physician or health care provider, especially when facing risky alternatives for dealing
with serious or life threatening diseases (e.g., Charles, Gafni, & Whelan, 1997; Frosch &
Kaplan, 1999; Légaré et al., 2008; Towle & Godolphin, 1999). There is also an extensive
literature exploring dyads through the study of intimate relationships, much of which is
relevant to decision making. For instance, studies often explore how variables such as
length and perceived quality of relationship influence relationship-related outcomes,
which presumably are the result of decisions made within the relationship (e.g., Aron,
Norman, Aron, McKenna & Heyman, 2000; Laurenceau, Barrett, & Pietromonaco,
1998). Studies of parents as dyads, or “decision units,” have also been examined,
particularly with respect to decisions about their children (Becker, 1974; Bostrom,
Hoffmann, Krupnick, Adamowicz, Goldman, McWilliams & Varner, 2005).
Each of these areas advances our knowledge of dyad decision making within a
specific set of circumstances (e.g., life-threatening illness) and concerning a particular
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type of dyad (e.g., father/mother). However, less attention has been given to more generic
cases, particularly with respect to day-to-day encounters with risky choice. This is
somewhat surprising given the quantity of research focused on risky choice by
individuals. Hundreds of studies designed to test hypotheses derived from expected
utility-type theories have produced a wealth of data on patterns of risky choice, typically
in the context of two-outcome gambles (see Mellers, Schwartz, & Cooke, 1998, for a
review). In the present study, I enlist this classic risky choice paradigm to compare
patterns of choice between individuals and dyads. I also move beyond the traditional
risky choice paradigm by comparing it to a newly introduced paradigm in which
individuals or dyads actively engage in management of an existing risk. In what follows,
I provide a brief overview of studies of individual risky choice, followed by a look at
related studies among dyads and small groups. I then introduce some general hypotheses
derived from theories dealing with motivation and social processes.
Psychophysical Influences on Risky Choices
Hundreds of studies have been done exploring human risky choice behavior (For
review, see Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; Kuhberger, 1998; Mellers, Schwartz, &
Cooke, 1998). Much of the impetus arose from attempts to test Expected Utility Theory
and later Prospect Theory. Bernoulli’s (1738, 1954) Expected Utility Theory focused
attention on probabilities and outcomes in describing risky choices. The theory suggests
that subjective values (known as utilities) differ from objective values (monetary
outcomes) in that the utility of gains increases at a slower rate as values move away from
zero. When utilities are graphed as a function of objective values, one would expect a
straight line if the two were equal to one another. However, the undervaluing of larger
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amounts results in a concave curve, or one that exhibits decreasing marginal utility. This
marginally decreasing utility function predicts that a guaranteed win (e.g., 100%
probability of winning $50) would be preferred over an equal probability of winning $0
or $100, even though the expected values of the two alternatives are the same. According
to the function, the difference between receiving $0 and $50 would be experienced as
larger than the difference between receiving $50 and $100, so that it would not be worth
giving up the $50 for sure to take a risk on possibly gaining $100. Hence, the concave
utility function can explain the commonly observed pattern that people tend to be risk
averse, avoiding risky alternatives in favor of safer (high probability) ones.
Essentially, Bernoulli’s explanation of risk averse behavior relied on the
psychophysics of values. Because the experienced or subjective magnitudes of options
systematically differ from the physical magnitudes, risks are routinely experienced as less
valuable than their mathematical expected values. Like other psychophysical principles,
this relationship has been confirmed so often that it has come to be known as the law of
diminishing marginal utility (e.g., Savage, 1954).
Over the years, scholars have suggested variations from the original expected
utility theory. The first variation, which drew immense attention among economists in the
1940s and 1950s, was introduced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, 1947). This
version included a canonical mathematical system, via which a rational decision maker
would be able to assure coherent and consistent risky choices, provided he or she was
willing to endorse a set of required axioms. Although von Neumann and Morgenstern did
not make any explicit claims about the inherent value of the axioms, many scholars
entered the debate about the status of these decision rules (most notably, Savage, 1954).
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Over time, these axioms were widely embraced as requirements for rationality, bestowing
the von Neumann and Morgenstern version of expected utility theory with a normative
status against which actual decision making could be evaluated.
A second variation to Bernoulli’s original theory was descriptive in nature.
Savage (1954) introduced the concept of subjective probability in Subjective Expected
Utility Theory. Savage’s preferred term was ‘personal probability’ (as originally
introduced by Thornton C. Fry), however, with time, the term ‘subjective probability’
gained acceptance among scholars. The basic premise of subjective probability is that,
like values, subjective assessment of probability does not always match the objective
probability associated with the outcome in question. Savage’s characterization does not
make it clear whether subjective probabilities can best be understood as resulting from
psychophysical processes or from individual differences in beliefs about likelihood.
The third variation to expected utility theory came in the form of Prospect Theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Like the original expected utility theory, prospect theory
starts with the assumption that risky choice behavior is primarily driven by
psychophysical processes; in particular, it retains the idea of marginally decreasing
sensitivity. Instead of utility, Kahneman and Tversky introduce a subjective value
function. For gains, the function is concave like the standard utility function. However,
Kahneman and Tversky also explicitly include losses in their subjective value function.
Oddly enough, by maintaining marginally decreasing sensitivity in the negative domain,
the function becomes convex, leading to the somewhat surprising prediction of a
tendency to be risk seeking (preferring the gamble over the sure thing) for losses.
Considering a risk of losing $50 for sure versus a 50% risk of losing $0 or $100, the
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difference between losing $0 and $50 would be experienced as larger (i.e., worse) than
the difference between losing $50 and $100, so that it would not be worth taking a loss of
$50 for sure to avoid a possibly larger loss of $100 (marginally decreasing sensitivity still
at work). This is likely to lead one to go for the risky alternative.
Together, this gives the prospect theory value function curve an S-like shape,
which is concave in the positive domain and convex in the negative domain. The
introduction of a specified origin in the value function is also significant. Kahneman and
Tversky suggest that perceptual processes are highly sensitive to changes and that the
subjective value function serves as a measure of change from some default asset position.
The origin represents this default position and serves as the reference point for choice.
This reference point is subject to change with each new decision, usually as a function of
changes in one’s status quo. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) call this reference
dependence, which implies that the perception of gains and losses is tied to the reference
point adopted for the decision. They hypothesize that minor to moderate changes in
reference point are not likely to substantially influence preferences.
Although Bernoulli briefly touched upon the issue of losses (Bernoulli, 1954, pp.
26-27), it was the prospect theory value function that clearly showed how choice
tendencies are likely to reflect a risk seeking attitude when dealing with perceived losses.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also argue that perceived losses are experienced more
strongly than perceived gains, which is visible in a steeper curve in the negative domain
of the value function. They call this loss aversion, and argue that, all else equal, “losses
loom larger than gains” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, pp. 279). For example, people are
reluctant to take an even bet that would result in either winning or losing some amount,
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say, $5. Most people would find this bet unattractive, because the perceived impact of the
negative consequence (losing $5) would seem stronger than the potential impact of the
equivalent positive consequence (winning $5).
Prospect theory also introduces the idea of decision weights. The decision weight
function retains the basic idea of subjective probability. Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
go beyond Savage’s characterization by describing decision weights not as simple
degrees of belief but as measures of a somewhat more complex construct of “the impact
of events on the desirability of prospects” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, pp. 280). They
argue that probabilities are subject to a decision weighting function, and the values of
possible outcomes are multiplied by these decision weights. Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) theorize that large probabilities tend to be underweighted and small probabilities
tend to be overweighted. So people will tend to feel less sure of highly likely outcomes
than is warranted and more sure of unlikely outcomes.
Prospect theory also incorporates a cognitive element with the introduction of an
“editing phase” in the decision making process. Kahneman and Tversky propose that
people usually engage in a “preliminary analysis” to simplify outcomes and probabilities,
prior to entering the evaluation phase. Although Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provide
some examples of how editing might occur, there is little systematic agreement about
these processes. Many studies use simple (“post-editing”) stimuli in order to test the
primary predictions of prospect theory and rule out editing processes as a possible
alternative explanation of results.
The next section provides a brief review of some of the findings on risky choice.
The focus is on the prospect theory prediction that is most often put to the test (See, e.g.,
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Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980; Kuhberger, 1998; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998;
Weber, 1999). The prediction involves a preference reversal pattern in which preferences
are risk averse for gains but are risk seeking for losses.
Soon after the original prospect theory was published, Hershey and Schoemaker
(1980) critically evaluated the generalizability of the preference reversal prediction by
studying decision making under risk both between and within subjects. They presented
participants with a series of choices between a sure gain/loss and a probabilistic gain/loss,
with matched expected values. Hershey and Schoemaker found little support for
Kahneman and Tversky’s predictions of risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses,
when making comparisons across subjects. When they did find a reversal (7-25% of
choices), it typically involved a sure thing with a high value or a gamble with high
variance. Given this weak support for Prospect Theory predictions regarding preference
reversals, perceptual influences on choice behavior may not be sufficient to describe
and/or explain risky choice behavior.
Kuhberger (1998) also completed a review of Prospect Theory’s preference
reversal prediction, but his focus was on framing effects and monetary gambles. Framing
effects occur when descriptions of the same set of alternatives in terms of gains versus
losses produce preference reversals. A typical example of a framing manipulation in
decision making research is the Asian Disease problem. This problem involves choice
options framed either in terms of possible lives saved (positive frame) or in terms of
possible lives lost (negative frame). In his review, Kuhberger found a low to moderate
impact of framing across studies, resulting in preference differences from positive to
negative domains. Kuhberger (1998) also reports preference reversals to be more
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common in the typical case of riskless choice (choices with certain outcomes or sure
things) and risky choice (probability of outcomes vary), in comparison to risky-risky
choice cases. Thus, while partial support of preference reversals was observed, the
question remains how generalizable these patterns are.
Levin, Schneider and Gaeth (1998) conducted a more refined review of framing
effect studies. After removing examples of framing that did not necessarily involve risky
choice, they were able to isolate cases in which risk preferences changed for positively
versus negatively framed outcomes. The majority of studies showed some effect of
framing, though few were clear preference reversals as Prospect Theory would predict. In
most cases, preferences appeared to differ across valence, but not by much. Clear
preference reversals were generally found only for studies in which the task domain was
similar to the Asian Disease Problem used by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) to introduce
framing effects. Several studies did not find significant differences in preferences for gain
and loss frames across different scenarios. This again points out the limited
generalizability of Prospect Theory predictions regarding preference reversals from risky
gains to losses.
Another vein of research focused on different definitions of risk, and showed how
different interpretations of risk could influence preferences. Weber (1999) distinguishes
perceived risk attitudes from traditional economic definitions of risk as variance. For
economists, risk aversion is associated with low variance outcomes and risk seeking with
high variance outcomes. Perceived risk attitude emphasizes the individual’s perception of
some alternative as more or less risky. Weber and colleagues found that the average
individual’s perception of risk may not be exclusively dependent on variance. The same
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alternative (for example, the low variance outcome alternative) could be perceived by the
decision maker as less risky in one domain and more risky in the other.
Using gamble pairs, Mellers, Schwartz, and Weber (1997) found economicallydefined risk attitudes to be reversed from gain to loss domains for the majority of subjects
(61%), which is consistent with Prospect Theory predictions (though somewhat weak).
However, they observed that perceived risk attitudes did not change in the same way.
Most participants (60%) were consistent across domains in their perceived risk attitude,
with 44% of all participants reporting that they were risk averters. This points out that
traditionally defined concepts of risk may not always fit with what people experience as
risk. These findings also raise a question about Prospect Theory’s ability to explain risky
choice in terms of perceptual or psychophysical processes. Logically, the Prospect
Theory implications regarding willingness to take risks and the perceived risk attitudes
studied by Weber and colleagues should match up. However, participants’ responses
indicated that their (and perhaps the lay person’s) interpretation of risk does not
necessarily equal the economic definition of risk assumed in Prospect Theory. This casts
some doubt on the classification of Prospect Theory as a perceptual theory of risky
choice.
Weber and Milliman (1997) studied perceived risk attitude and risk preference in
paradigms of commuter train times and financial investments (with hypothetically
endowed amounts). They also found that participants tended to be consistent in their risk
preferences based on their assessment of perceived riskiness of alternatives. Over 75% of
the participants exhibited consistent perceived-risk attitudes across gain and loss
domains, and more than 65% consistently chose the less risky alternative across domains
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in both the commuter train times and financial investments studies. They observed risk
seeking preferences in the gain domain, when participants expressed their preferences for
commuter train times. Thus, results were not consistent with preference reversal
predictions of Prospect Theory. Additionally, here too, the concept of perceived risk
attitude, as reported by participants, did not match with the standard economic
interpretation of risk as variance.
Weber and colleagues’ work provides weak support for the kinds of preference
reversals predicted by Prospect Theory, especially in cases involving sure things and high
risk situations. At the same time, their work also highlights problems with the basis for
Prospect Theory predictions. Prospect Theory may not adequately capture people’s
experience of riskiness, thus the perceptual underpinnings of the theory may be in
question.
In summary, there is mixed support for Prospect Theory preference reversal
predictions. The prediction is most likely to hold for choices involving a risky option
compared to a sure thing. The lack of generalizability points out that there may be
additional influencing factors on risky choice than those proposed in Prospect Theory.
Most people tend to have a strong reaction when they are exposed to risk, which may be
reflected in their perceived attitude toward risk. As we have seen, this experience is not
reflected in the economic view of risk. One aspect of perceived risk that is ignored in
both economic theory and Prospect Theory views of risky choice is an affective or
motivational component which intuitively is an integral part of risky situations. People
routinely describe the experience of hope and fear associated with taking risks. In
addition, pre-existing orientations, or personality characteristics, may also play a role in

11
determining how people react to risk in general. Therefore, looking into dispositional and
motivational factors may give us another perspective on people’s dealings with risk. The
next section reviews briefly approaches exploring this possibility.
Motivational and Dispositional Influences on Risky Choices
Another approach to risky decision making explains the process as arising from
dispositional and motivational sources, rather than psychophysical ones. Lopes
introduced the SP/A (Security Potential/Aspiration) theory, which brings in affective
influences that are more in line with traditional approach-avoidance paradigms (Lopes,
1984, 1987; Schneider & Lopes, 1986). Lopes does not deny the relevance of the
marginally decreasing utility function. She rather draws attention to the differences in the
theoretical approaches to describing decision behavior. Lopes (1984, 1987) suggests that
there are two dispositional inclinations towards risk that differ according to appetitive
versus avoidant reactions to risk. Those with a security focus are dispositionally inclined
to avoid the negative consequences associated with risk taking and those with a potential
focus are dispositionally inclined toward approaching the positive consequences
associated with risk taking. Lopes suggests that most people are security oriented, and
are thus typically risk averse in their behavior.
SP/A theory also suggests that situational factors introduce another approachavoidance variable, in particular, with respect to aspiration levels. High aspiration levels
typically require that some risk must be tolerated in order to reach a goal, whereas lower
aspiration levels may be reached without having to take risks. SP/A theory implies that
risk preferences will be strong when dispositional tendencies match situational needs, but

12
will be weaker and more conflicted when dispositional tendencies are at odds with
situational needs.
According to Lopes, most people are likely to exhibit risk averse decision patterns
most of the time, because most people are hypothesized to have security-prone
dispositions. There are two occasions, however, when even security-minded people may
engage in risk-seeking behavior. First, when they feel safe (i.e., when no element of
threat to their sense of security exists), they may feel comfortable taking risk. So, for
instance, security-minded people might be willing to take a risk when all outcomes
involve something positive. The second occasion is on the other extreme, when securityminded people are under great threat. In such threatening situations, no safe alternative is
available, and any hope of getting out of the situation may require taking a risk. In these
cases, the disposition to “play it safe” is in conflict with the aspiration to avoid
acceptance of a bad outcome.
Instead of using two-outcome gambles, Schneider and Lopes (1986) used a more
complex set of multi-outcome lotteries to study decision preferences of individuals who
were pre-screened as dispositionally risk averse or risk seeking. They found 70% of their
prescreened participants to be dispositionally risk averse (risk averse participants).
Schneider and Lopes (1986) observed complex patterns of risk preferences, which
emphasized that, factors other than perception must also be at work. They found weak
support for reversal of preferences from risk averse to risk seeking in gain to loss
domains predicted by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). With the exception of lotteries
with a better-than-zero (risk less lottery) worst outcome, the typical risk averse
participant was strongly risk averse for gains. Hence, the sure thing was strongly
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preferred in most cases. Lotteries that guaranteed more than zero were also quite
popular, and sometimes preferred to the sure thing. Lotteries with minimum outcomes
greater than zero pose no threat to the sense of security, since there is nothing to lose with
these gambles. This may have allowed the participants to raise their aspiration level
higher than the sure thing. The riskless lotteries offer the opportunity for winning an
amount higher than the sure amount, possibly closer to the raised aspiration level.
However, in the loss domain, the possibility of losing at least some amount posed
a serious threat to the participant’s sense of safety. Therefore, for loss lotteries, the
typically risk averse participant exhibited a mixed pattern of preferences. For losses,
participants appeared to dislike the lotteries at both extremes; the safest (including sure
thing) probably because it does not meet their aspiration levels, and the riskiest, probably
because the threat to security is too high, and they wanted to minimize the chance of the
worst loss.
Higgins’ Self Discrepancy Theory (1987) and later the Regulatory Focus
Theory/Principle (1997) also share a focus on motivational and dispositional factors
influencing human experience and behavior. Higgins’ early work centered on explaining
personality differences in terms of dispositional tendencies to focus on discrepancies in
self-concept relative to an “ideal” self or relative to an “ought” self. Higgins found that
those who focus on self-concept discrepancies with the “ideal” self are more apt to
regularly experience emotions such as joy and dejection, whereas those who focus on
discrepancies with the “ought” self are more likely to experience feelings of relief and
anxiety. These findings eventually led to Higgins’ concept of regulatory focus, which
highlights motivational influences in personality. In particular, Higgins hypothesizes that
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some people tend to focus on promoting the positive, whereas others prioritize preventing
the negative (Higgins, 1998; Shah & Higgins, 1997). Higgins connects an individual’s
ideal self discrepancy concerns with promotion focused strategic inclinations, where one
seeks matches with positive outcomes, such as hopes and aspirations. Higgins connects
the individual’s ought self discrepancy concerns with prevention focused strategic
inclinations, where one seeks prevention of mismatches with negative outcomes often
associated with duties and obligations, (Higgins, 1996; Higgins, Roney, Crowe, &
Hymes, 1994). The prevention-promotion distinction in regulatory focus is conceptually
similar to Lopes’s security-potential dichotomy. Both emphasize the importance of
approach-avoidance motivation as a guide in behavior.
Crowe and Higgins (1997) studied the impact of regulatory focus on strategic
inclinations in decision making, using a signal detection paradigm. Crowe and Higgins
(1997) associated a risky response bias with promotion-focused individuals and a
conservative response bias with prevention-focused individuals. They found that
promotion-focused individuals were more likely to take risks (be more prone to getting
‘hits’ and ‘false alarms’), and prevention-focused individuals were more likely to play it
safe, and generally be risk averse (be more prone to avoiding ‘misses’ and getting
‘correct rejections’). This finding may be mapped on to Lopes (and colleagues’) work
connecting potential-oriented persons with risk seeking and security-oriented people with
risk aversion (Lopes, 1984, 1987; Schneider & Lopes, 1986).
Weber and Milliman (1997) also drew the connection between dispositional and
situational factors in their explanation for risk preferences and perceived risk attitudes. In
choices between possible commuter train times, they observed risk seeking (i.e., higher
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variance) preferences for 61% of the participants in the gain domain. This does not match
what would be predicted by the Prospect Theory value function. Weber and Milliman
(1997) cite aspiration level as the possible influencing factor behind people’s preferences
for the higher variance train times in the gain domain. When all options were faster than
average, people could rely on some savings either way, so that none of the options would
have a downside or—in SP/A terms—be a threat to security or the status quo. Thus,
aspiration levels could be raised without any worry, so that the possibility of saving the
maximum time could now be considered the more attractive alternative. Risk perceptions
were also apparently sensitive to this lack of a downside. Greater unpredictability, when
there was no downside, was associated with the possibility of the greatest savings, and so
was seen by some (34%) as less risky.
In the loss domain, where trains were running slower than current average
commute time, however, concern for avoiding the maximum time loss frequently led
participants to make risk averse choices in traditional terms. In this case, greater
unpredictability had a downside, or an element of threat (e.g., being late for work or
class), which was seen by the overwhelming majority as more dangerous or risky. Weber
and Milliman (1997), therefore, emphasized that what people considered as “risky”
changed from one domain to the other. These observations also point out that real life
contingencies may be a determining factor behind assessments of riskiness.
Dispositional and motivational theories have thus informed researchers of the
possibility of pre-existing tendencies and situational characteristics together influencing
people’s behavior. They remind us that people’s initial (gut-level) reaction towards risk
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may set the tone for the decision making process; but the complete process may involve
impact of situational demands as well.
From a review of the existing literature on risky decision making, Prospect
Theory has done fairly well in describing standard risky choice behavior, particularly
when sure things or extreme outcomes have been involved. Nevertheless, it is not clear
that Prospect Theory’s reliance on psychophysics gets to the heart of the experience of
risk, and thus, may be inadequate or incomplete as a theory of risky choice. Motivational
and dispositional explanations, including the SP/A Theory, potentially may expand the
ability to understand risky choice across a larger variety of risky decision situations.
With the objective of exploring these different influences on risky decision
making, the present study includes two different tasks. I hypothesize that the simpler
psychophysical explanation is more likely to be plausible in situations that are more
superficial and less actively engaging. In contrast, motivational and dispositional
influences are more likely to be seen when the decision situation demands a more active
level of engagement on the part of the decision maker. The first task is the standard
passive risky choice task, which is a paradigm expected to favor the perceptual
perspective. The second task is a novel active managing risk task (Schneider, Hudspeth &
Decker, manuscript in preparation), which may be more likely to engage dispositional
and motivational processes.
Additionally, the author explores decision making in dyads, which provides the
opportunity to examine whether the introduction of another person into the decision
making environment may bring in yet another set of factors: social influences. Findings
related to possible social influences on risky choice will be discussed next.
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Social Influences on Decision Making in Groups and Dyads
While group phenomena have been studied extensively in various sub-areas of
psychology throughout the last century, studies of decision making under conditions of
risk comparing groups and individuals became popular starting in the early sixties. Hunt
and Rowe (1960), Stoner (1961) and Wallach, Kogan and Bem (1962) are a few names
among researchers who studied risky decision making in individuals and groups in the
early sixties.
Wallach et al., (1962) found groups to be more inclined to prefer risky
alternatives over cautious ones following group discussions, as compared to individuals
in the absence of discussion. In Wallach et al.’s, (1962) study, group members were
previously unacquainted and had the same status (no identifiable influential
characteristics) when group members began interacting. Participants considered several
scenarios, and in each they provided their recommendation regarding the lowest
probability of success that the character in the scenario should require before selecting
the riskier of two options. In questions afterward, some individual members of the group
reported that individuals who were more risky tended to be more influential in the group
than those who were more cautious.
Wallach et al., (1962) offer two possible explanations for the observed risky shift
phenomenon. First, Wallach et al., (1962) consider ‘diffusion of responsibility’ among
group members as a possible reason for the shift towards riskier decisions following
group discussion. Diffusion of responsibility occurs when being part of a larger group
reduces individual member’s sense of personal accountability or responsibility for the
outcomes of decisions. Wallach, Kogan and Bem (1964) speculate that this phenomenon
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may be related to decreased anxiety from emotional bonds created in the group setting,
where risk is perceived as shared. Second, Wallach et al., (1962) consider the possibility
that risk takers tend to be more influential in groups and that this could play a role in the
observed shift towards riskier decisions following group discussion. They propose that
these individuals might be more inclined to take initiative in mediating the group
discussion. Such initiative could lead to greater acceptance of risk in the decision making,
compared to average pre-discussion individual preferences.
With respect to the present thesis, the question is whether we shall observe similar
decision patterns in dyads. Previous work suggests that the presence of many people in a
group provides the possibility that a given individual’s sense of accountability may be
diminished. However, when only two people are present, as in a dyad, both are at least
partly responsible for the decision outcomes. Therefore, for dyads, it is questionable
whether diffusion of responsibility would occur. Also, with two people, the hypothesis
that risk takers might be more influential seems less likely given that both people are
required to interact to make the decision.
Using a similar design as the one used by Wallach et al., (1962), Stoner (1961)
compared risky decisions in groups and individuals. He observed a risky shift in majority
of his participants. However, not all group members were consistently more risky across
all items following discussion. Nordhøy (1962) revisited Stoner (1961) and Wallach et
al.’s (1962) work. He observed that, for at least some of their choice items, several group
members exhibited a cautious shift following group discussion.
Stoner (1961, 1968) explains this with reference to the general value hypotheses
of Nordhøy (1962) and Brown (1965). According to this hypothesis, group decision shifts
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would be to riskier or safer (more cautious) alternatives depending on how they match
with widely held values within the culture, which will be reflected in the individual’s
original inclinations. For example, if decisions concern a choice such as marriage, the
culturally approved value may rest on the side of caution rather than risk; in such cases,
group discussion is likely to lead to more cautious decisions, compared to individuals
making decisions by themselves.
The risky and cautious shift observations were later described as variations of a
single phenomenon called group (attitude) polarization (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969). A
wide range of theoretical and research work has been carried out in the area of group
polarization, from the pioneering work of Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969), to Myers and
Lamm (1976) to more recent work by Stasser and Titus (2006), and Luhan, Kocher and
Sutter (2009). Group polarization occurs when discussion among the group members
creates the sense of a single decision making unit, working towards a shared goal. This
often causes individual preferences to align with that of the group majority. Inclination of
the majority of the individual members in a group is strengthened when the group
behaves as a decision making unit. Research with groups has shown that groups make
significantly “more extreme” choices than individuals (For review, see Isenberg, 1986;
Myers & Lamm, 1976). Notably, decisions tend to be made in the same directions as
majority of the individuals.
Research has shown that individuals who made moderately risky decisions prior
to group interaction made even riskier choices following group discussion, whereas
individuals who made initially cautious preferences showed a heightened tendency to
choose safer alternatives following group discussion (e.g., Deets & Hoyt, 1970;
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McCauley, Stitt, Woods & Lipton, 1974; Zaleska, 1974, 1976). Thus, the polarization
effect produces the same pattern of pre-discussion preferences, only more pronounced.
Notice that the risky or cautious shift is sometimes consistent with polarization processes,
but not always. If group discussion shifts decisions in a direction opposite to the one
originally favored by many individuals (e.g., risky shift in which risk averse individuals
gravitate to more risky choices after discussion), this would be inconsistent with a
polarization explanation.
For the present thesis, the relevant question is concerned with how dyads’
decision preferences may be affected by group—or in this case, partner-discussion. If
polarization takes place in dyads, dyad members will make more extreme decisions
together compared to individuals. So, if individuals are typically risk averse, dyads would
be expected to be even more risk averse. If individuals are risk seeking, dyads will be
even more so. If risky or cautious shifts occur, dyads will tend to take more of less risks,
respectively, than individuals, independent of individual predispositions.
There are few studies that allow a comparison of risky/cautious shift versus group
polarization hypotheses in the context of dyads. In one of the rare exceptions, Keller,
Sarin and Sounderpandian (2002, 2007) compared individual and dyad preferences for
monetary gambles involving risk (i.e., stated probabilities) or uncertainty (i.e., unknown
probabilities). In all conditions, they found that cautious shifts predominated. Both
individual and dyad tended to be risk averse. Most dyads (typically around 60%) became
more risk averse (i.e., cautious) than individuals when facing risky and ambiguous
monetary choice situations. However, there was also a sizable minority that became less
risk averse (i.e., risky shift, typically around 25-30%). Although the majority results are
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consistent with a group polarization explanation, the subset of dyads that moved in a
riskier direction suggest that other social influences were also present.
In a more recent study, Hardisty and Sanitioso (2007) studied three-person groups
using various communication media to make hypothetical decisions about taking business
risks. Hardisty and Sanitioso found that face-to-face discussion as well as video
conferencing led to more extreme group decisions compared to individual ones. The
pattern of results was consistent with Prospect Theory predictions of risk aversion for
gains and risk seeking for losses, though more extreme for groups than individuals.
However, they did not find this effect of polarization for instant messaging (IM). For the
IM condition, participants showed an opposite effect, expressing risk aversion for losses,
and moving toward risk seeking for gains (though in both conditions, they were generally
in favor of the sure option). Again, there is partial support for the role of group
polarization but only for two of the three media.
Work on peer influences may also provide some insight into social influences in
dyad decision making. Gardner and Steinberg (2005) studied the impact of peer
influence on risk preference, risk taking, and risky decision making by comparing
individuals and three person groups in adolescents (13-16 year olds), youths (18-22 year
olds), and adults (24 years and older). The authors tested risk-taking using a video game
about driving called ‘Chicken.’ In the video game, participants were required to make
decisions about stopping or continuing to drive after a traffic light turns yellow. While
continuing could earn more points for the participant, crashing if the light turned red
before the car stopped would lead to losing all points. Gardner and Steinberg found in all
three age groups that individuals engaged in more risk taking when in presence of two
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other same-age individuals volunteering advice than when alone. They observed the
overall impact of peer influence (enhancing risky inclinations) to be most prominent in
adolescents and young adults compared to older adults. The individuals in peer groups
thus exhibited a risky shift, especially among adolescents. Because our dyad participants
are mostly in the youth (young adult) age range, we are likely to observe some effect of
peer influence on risk preferences. Although it was not possible in Gardner and
Steinberg’s study to assess whether the shift in preferences was consistent with
polarization of risk attitudes, the present work will provide the opportunity to observe
whether polarization versus risky shift patterns occur in dyads.
In addition to peer influences, the literature on persuasion may also provide
insight into social influences in decision making. Wood’s (2000) review of the persuasion
and social influences in social interactions revealed that motivations about the self, the
other and the situation may all bring about changes in attitude. One way that social
influence may occur is through learning new arguments in favor or against an alternative.
According to the classic Persuasive Arguments Theory (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977;
Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974, 1978; Vinokur, Trope & Burnstein, 1975), for instance, each
member of a group is only aware of a few of the existing arguments in favor of a choice.
Group interaction offers the opportunity for exposure to a greater number of arguments
compared to deciding alone. If discussion leads to a greater number of arguments
favoring riskier over safer alternatives, the Persuasive Arguments Theory would suggest
a riskier choice, and vice versa (Vinokur, Trope & Burnstein, 1975). In the context of the
present study, dyads may potentially come up with more arguments in favor of the riskier
(or safer) alternatives and therefore make decisions towards (or away from) risk
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depending on cognitive availability of arguments. According to SP/A theory, since most
people are likely to be more concerned with security, they may also be more likely to
think up arguments in support of caution rather than risk, leading to an increase in risk
averse decisions.
Finally, one of the other factors that could be a possible social influence on the
dyad decision process is norms. According to Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), from food
sharing to mating practices to religious traditions, and cooperative as well as defense
activities, social norms have a large role in influencing human behavior. Clark (1984),
Elster (1989), Fiske (1992) and Heyman and Ariely (2004) observed the application of
different sets of norms by people when dealing with different sets of scenarios. Out of
these, two major categories have been noted: social and economic (market) norms.
Compared to the economic market, which usually involves a clear exchange of equivalent
benefits (e.g., a person expects to pay a certain amount of money to receive a good of a
given value), the social context is more complex. The social context involves different
types of interactions, and different types of norm relations (e.g., a person may not expect
to pay for a good given to them by a parent). Additionally, there are varying
circumstances, in which the same relations can take on different considerations (e.g., a
friend becomes one’s work supervisor), requiring reassessment of norms to be applied.
Therefore, in social interactions, the norms may be harder to determine and apply a
priori. Kerr, Garst, Lewandowski and Harris (1997) studied the influence of human
tendency to behave according to established group norms compared to inclination to act
following internalized personal norms. They found that personal convictions were not the
only predictor of how people behaved, but that group norms, which were defined and
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established via group discussion, also contributed to behavior. In working with dyads, we
might also expect that social norms may become a part of the decision process. Because
the dyads will be working cooperatively toward a common outcome, we expect that
social norms would be likely to enhance collaborative efforts.
In the context of the present research, we imagine that dyad partners will be
motivated both to persuade their task partner towards their own way of thinking, but also
to work cooperatively toward a common goal. If security is a more common motivation
as predicted by SP/A Theory, the dyads may be able to accomplish both goals by tending
toward risk averse choices. The next section describes in details the general and specific
hypotheses.
Hypotheses and Predictions
The thesis presents the opportunity to explore whether individuals and dyads
respond similarly when dealing with risk in different situations. For each research
question, competing hypotheses supported by each relevant theoretical perspective are
delineated.
Research question 1. Does risky decision making differ across situational
contexts?
Competing hypothesis 1. If Prospect Theory value function predictions hold
across multiple situations, then for both risky choice and risk management tasks,
participants would exhibit a risk averse pattern of preferences for gains and a risk seeking
pattern for losses.
Competing hypothesis 2. If SP/A theory predictions hold across multiple
situations, then for both risky choice and risk management tasks, participants would
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exhibit a general risk averse pattern of preferences. Some risk taking may be observed,
particularly for choices involving assured gains, and posing no threat to security.
Competing hypothesis 3. If risky decision making differs due to the nature of the
situation, then the two theories may apply differentially based on the psychological
processes most likely to be activated. The Risky Choice task seems more passive, static,
and reactive whereas Risk Management was designed to be more active, dynamic, and
situated. Therefore prospect theory may be better able to predict risky choice preferences
whereas SP/A theory may be better able to predict risk management preferences.
Prospect Theory is a theory of choice (with the characteristics listed above); so
Prospect Theory should do a good job of predicting results for the choice task, risk
seeking for losses and risk averse for gains. Since stimuli are in effect equivalent across
tasks, Prospect Theory should do just as well at predicting the management task unless
the process of actively changing one’s current situation is fundamentally different from
passively responding to given alternatives. Active decision making may engage
motivational processes more, which could change the pattern of decision making.
SP/A theory is a theory about how dispositions and situational motivations affect
risk preferences. Ideally, the theory should be applicable to both choice and risk
management tasks. However, the decision making literature shows risky choice behavior
to be fairly consistent with prospect theory predictions, but these are all for standard
(passive) risky choice situations, and usually situations involving a sure thing versus a
two-outcome risk where one outcome is zero. SP/A may do better for other gain and loss
lotteries (ones that may not involve a sure thing or zero outcome).
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Risk management, by definition, is a more active, dynamic undertaking that is
likely to initiate motivational processes that are more typical of daily-life decision
making. In particular, because management involves dealing with a situation over time, it
might better reflect the combination of dispositional, motivational, and situational
influences hypothesized in SP/A theory. Tendencies toward ensuring security or seeking
potential might be exaggerated due to the active manipulation of worse and better
outcomes in risk management. Aspiration levels might be more salient in the
management task than the choice task because participants may set a level as part of their
management strategy. Thus, overall, SP/A theory predictions may be more predictive in
active risk management tasks compared to passive risky choice tasks.
Schneider and colleagues (Schneider, Hudspeth and Decker, manuscript in
preparation) showed that, in individuals, tasks focused on newly introduced risk (as in
standard risky choice) yielded remarkably different patterns from an analogous situation
that was presented as a problem of managing existing risk. In the first (risky choice)
study, they found a weak pattern of results roughly consistent with prospect theory with
risk seeking in negative and risk aversion in the positive domain. However, in the risk
management study, they observed a distinctly risk averse approach on behalf of the
individuals when approaching risk overall. In a sense, in the risk management study, the
individual (or the dyad in the present study) is endowed with this (existing) risk and has
to manage it. This active aspect of risk management is likely to be influenced by
motivational factors, more so perhaps than the passive risky choice task. In the present
work, the opportunity was available to extend these findings to decision making in dyads.
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Research question 2. How might risk taking differ from individuals to
dyads?
The social psychological literature offers at least two relevant perspectives
regarding influences of social factors on risky decision making. According to the
risky/cautious shift perspective, groups (in the present work, dyads) would engage in
greater/lesser risk taking following group discussion. This shift would be irrespective of
the original attitude of majority of the individual participants. According to the group
polarization perspective, on the other hand, dyads would make more extreme decisions in
the same direction as the majority of individuals. Because both SP/A and Prospect
Theory posit different risk preference patterns as a function of outcome valence, the
prediction for group polarization assumes that individuals’ attitudes toward risk may vary
for gains and losses. Therefore, preferences of individuals at various outcome levels were
used as the indicator of majority individual attitudes for gains versus losses.
Competing hypothesis 1. According to the risky shift literature of group decision
making, groups tend to take more risks than individuals. In contrast, the cautious
hypothesis suggests that groups avoid risk more than individuals.
If risky or cautious shift and Prospect Theory (PT) were both to be correct in
predicting individuals’ and dyads’ risk preferences, results would show a pattern
illustrated in Figure 1. So, for PT and risky shift predictions to be correct, dyads would
tend in all cases to make riskier decisions compared to individuals as shown in the dotted
line above the individual data. On the other hand, if PT and cautious shift predictions
were correct, dyads would consistently make safer choices than individuals as indicated
by the more risk averse preferences in the dotted line below the individual data.
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Prospect Theory & Risky/Cautious Shifts Predictions
Risk Seeking
Predicted Risk Preference

Individuals
Dyad Risky Shift
Dyad Cautious Shift

0.50

Risk Aversion
$0
Outcome Valence
Losses
Gains

Figure 1. Predictions for Risk Preferences according to Prospect Theory
and Risky and Cautious Shift Perspectives
Competing hypothesis 2. Assuming that individual majority preferences are
indicative of typical risk attitudes, the group polarization hypothesis would suggest that
dyad discussion would strengthen those initial attitudes and exaggerate patterns of risk
behavior. However, this shift could be either in the direction of risk or caution, depending
on dyad partners’ original predispositions. If Prospect Theory and group polarization
perspectives were both correctly predicting risk preferences, decision behavior patterns
would be likely to resemble the dotted preference curve in Figure 2.
Overall, dyads would continue the same pattern of preferences of risk seeking for
losses and risk aversion for gains, as predicted for individuals in PT. If group polarization
took place, the only notable change would be an emphasized pattern for the dyads in each
domain. Therefore, dyads would tend to be more risk seeking for losses and more risk
averse for gains compared to individuals.
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Prospect Theory & Group Polarization Predictions

Predicted Risk Preference

Risk Seeking

Individuals
Dyad - Group Polarization

0.50

Risk Aversion
$0
Outcome Valence
Losses
Gains

Figure 2. Predictions for Risk Preferences according to Prospect Theory
and Group Polarization Perspectives
Competing hypothesis 3. If risky or cautious shift and SP/A Theory were both to
be correct in predicting individuals’ and dyads’ risk preferences, results would show a
pattern illustrated in Figure 3. For SP/A and risky shift predictions to be correct, dyads
would make riskier decisions compared to individuals as shown in the dotted line above
the individual data. On the other hand, if SP/A and cautious shift predictions were
correct, dyads would consistently make more risk averse choices than individuals as
indicated by the dotted line below the individual data. If group polarization were coupled
with SP/A theory predictions, dyad preferences would resemble the same pattern as for
cautious shift because majority preferences under SP/A theory are expected to be
predominantly risk averse across most if not all outcome values.
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SP/A, Risky/Cautious Shift & Group Polarization Predictions
Individuals

Predicted Risk Preference

Risk Seeking

Dyad Risky Shift
Dyad Cautious Shift + Group
Polarization
0.50

Risk Aversion

$0

Outcome Valence
Losses
Gains

Figure 3. Predictions for Risk Preferences according to SP/A Theory
and Risky versus Cautious Shift and Group Polarization Perspectives

Few studies have explored group versus individual preferences across outcome
valences. One exception, Marquis and Reitz (1969) observed that groups would take
more risks than individuals for positive expected values, but were less likely to take risks
for negative expected values, with no discernable change for zero expected value. This
was consistent with the original individual preference patterns suggesting that group
polarization processes provided a better explanation than either a general risky shift or a
cautious shift. These results also provide support for the idea that social influences may
affect risk taking differently as a function of outcome valence (and in this case were
generally supportive of the pattern anticipated in SP/A theory rather than PT).
Research question 3: How might risk taking differ for valence (negative,
mixed, and positive lotteries)?
Competing hypothesis 1. According to Prospect Theory, for positive lotteries
which would result in gains, risk averse preferences are expected. For negative lotteries
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representing losses, a general inclination towards risk taking would be observed. For
mixed lotteries (wherein outcomes include losses, gains, and/or zero), preference patterns
are likely to be exaggerated because the value function implies that sensitivity to
changing values should be greatest for values closest to zero. For negative expected
values, an intensified risk seeking pattern of preferences would be expected, and for
positive expected values, a stronger risk averse pattern would be expected.
Competing hypothesis 2. According to SP/A theory, an overall risk averse pattern
is predicted. Loss lotteries present a more tangible threat to people’s sense of security,
supporting risk aversion. For gain lotteries, no tangible threat to security is present.
Therefore, if aspiration level is set (moderately) high, the individual may engage in some
risk taking. For mixed lotteries, concern for security would push decision makers away
from outcomes with losses. For lotteries with negative expected values, this would
typically lead to risk aversion in order to avoid the worst possible loss, but occasionally
might support risk seeking if the riskier option is the only one that involves the chance to
lose nothing. For lotteries with positive expected values, security-seeking would lead to
strong risk aversion when the riskier option involves a possible loss, and weaker risk
aversion when the riskier option’s worst outcome is zero.
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Method
This thesis brings together findings from four different studies, comparing risky
decision making in dyads and individuals in two different tasks. One task is the standard
passive risky choice task, which requires participants to react to pre-determined risky
alternatives. The other is a novel managing risk task, which requires participants to
actively modify a risk that they are currently facing. Only data for dyads were collected
as part of the thesis. Data for individuals were collected by Schneider, Hudspeth and
Decker (manuscript in preparation) earlier. Each set of data was collected in a different
semester, from virtually the same participant pool of undergraduate students enrolled in
Psychology courses, with a high consistency of demographic characteristics across
semesters.
Participants
Data were collected following university IRB requirements from students enrolled
in undergraduate Psychology courses for course credit. After an introduction to the
lotteries, a quiz was administered to ensure that participants understood the task. The
quiz assessed basic understanding of probabilities and how probabilities relate to
outcomes in lotteries. It also tested whether participants comprehended the computerized
representations used to display the lotteries. Data for participants who failed the quiz
were not included in analyses. For dyads, both participants had to pass the quiz for their
combined data to be included in analysis.
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For individuals, 47 out of 63 participants passed the quiz in the risky choice task
and 69 out of 79 participants passed the quiz in the risk management task. For dyads,
both members passed the quiz in 26 out of 44 dyads in the Risky Choice task and 42 out
of 56 dyads in the Risk Management task. Although there was considerable variation in
pass rates, this was not unusual given extensive data on semester-by-semester variability
in similar studies.
Materials
The same twenty-three pairs of monetary lotteries were used (in different ways) as
stimuli in each of the risky decision making tasks. Each lottery in a pair could result in
one of two equally probable outcomes, i.e., every lottery was composed of two outcomes,
each with a 50% chance of occurring. One lottery in each pair was riskier than the other.
The riskier lottery had tickets that were farther apart in value, representing more extreme
potential outcomes. The less risky lottery had tickets that were more similar in outcome
value, offering the participants a better functional sense of where they might end up.
Table 1 shows the complete set of lottery pairs that were used.
The pairs of lotteries covered a wide range of outcome values from -$300 to
+$300, and were classified in terms of outcome valences as all negative (NN; loss lottery
pairs), mixed negative (MN), mixed positive (MP) and all positive (PP; gain lottery
pairs). Each outcome valence condition was made up of six lotteries that were factorially
determined using a 3 x 2 Variance x Relative Expected Value (RelEV) design. Variance
conditions were defined according to three degrees of ticket separation. For the high
variance lottery pairs, the outcomes of the riskier lottery were separated by $200 and the
outcomes of the less risky lottery were separated by $100. For the medium variance
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lottery pairs, the outcomes in the riskier and less risky lotteries were separated by $150
and $50 respectively. For the low variance lottery pairs, the outcomes in the riskier and
less risky lotteries were separated by $100 and $0 (zero) respectively. Relative expected
value was defined by relative outcome distance from zero. The outcome that is farther
from zero would count as high relative EV while the outcome closer to zero would count
as low relative EV.
The 3x2 factorial construction of the lottery pairs in each outcome valence set
was adopted to systematically ensure a comprehensive range of stimuli. Although
Variance and Relative Expected Value have been analyzed elsewhere (Schneider,
Hudspeth & Decker, manuscript in preparation), a detailed exploration of these
influences on decision making are beyond the scope of the thesis.
Design
The study used a 2 x 2 x 4 (Decision Maker [individual, dyad] x Task [risky
choice, risk management] x Outcome Valence [all negative, mixed negative, mixed
positive, all positive]) Repeated Measures Factorial design. Decision Maker was a
between-subjects variable representing whether the decisions were being made by an
individual or a dyad. The data for dyads were collected as part of the Master’s thesis, and
compared to existing data for individuals (which were collected previously by Schneider,
Hudspeth, & Decker, manuscript in preparation). Task was also a between-subjects
variable; some of the subjects completed the Risky Choice task and the remainder
completed the Risk Management task. Outcome Valence was a within-subjects variable
with 4 levels: all negative (NN, losses), mixed negative (MN), mixed positive (MP) and
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Table 1. Lottery Stimuli broken down by Expected Values and Variability

Lottery
(by
Trial)

Risk Seeking
Low
High
Ticket
Ticket

Risk Averse
Low
High
Ticket
Ticket

Rel
EV

Variance

Valence

Expected
Values

B

NN

-200

High

High

-300

-100

-250

-150

C

NN

-175

High

Medium

-250

-100

-200

-150

D

NN

-150

High

Low

-200

-100

-150

-150

E

NN

-150

Low

High

-250

-50

-200

-100

F

NN

-125

Low

Medium

-200

-50

-150

-100

G

NN

-100

Low

Low

-150

-50

-100

-100

H

MN

-100

High

High

-200

0

-150

-50

I

MN

-75

High

Medium

-150

0

-100

-50

J

MN

-50

High

Low

-100

0

-50

-50

K

MN

-50

Low

High

-150

50

-100

0

L

MN

-25

Low

Medium

-100

50

-50

0

M

MN

0

Low

Low

-50

50

0

0

M

MP

0

Low

Low

-50

50

0

0

P

MP

25

Low

Medium

-50

100

0

50

Q

MP

50

Low

High

-50

150

0

100

R

MP

50

High

Low

0

100

50

50

S

MP

75

High

Medium

0

150

50

100

T

MP

100

High

High

0

200

50

150

U

PP

100

Low

Low

50

150

100

100

V

PP

125

Low

Medium

50

200

100

150

W

PP

150

Low

High

50

250

100

200

X

PP

150

High

Low

100

200

150

150

Y

PP

175

High

Medium

100

250

150

200

Z

PP

200

High

High

100

300

150

250

In each experiment, Trial M was presented to participants only once. However, for all
analyses, the data for Trial M, which has an expected value of Zero, were included twice,
once to represent the Mixed Negative set and once to represent the Mixed Positive set.
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all positive (PP, gains). These levels are described in more detail in the Materials
section.
The dependent variable was Risk Preference, which was measured as number of
times out of 6 that the riskier option was selected. These 6 opportunities correspond to
the six lottery pair trials within each Outcome Valence condition.
To minimize potential order effects, eight different stimulus orders were used.
These orders were systematically manipulated to ensure that each lottery pair would
appear at the beginning, middle or end of the stimulus sequence for at least some
participants. Also, the orders were checked to be sure that similar stimuli did not cooccur too often, and that the four outcome valence conditions were represented roughly
evenly throughout the sequence of trials.
Procedure
Stimuli presentation and data collection were done via a computer program.
Twelve computers in the laboratory were set up so that two of those computers would run
the same order of the lottery at any given time. Participants choosing to sit at those
matched computers were therefore assigned to work as partners in a dyad. Previously
unacquainted participants were assigned to dyads in this way to reduce the likelihood that
relationship dynamics could influence responses. Matched computers were arranged such
that the partners in a dyad would not face each other. Thus, care was taken to avoid the
influence of nonverbal communication. A minimum of four participants (two dyads) were
run in each session to maintain anonymity of partners.
On entering the lab, participants were instructed to take a seat at any of several
computers with a lit screen. Instructions regarding the basic task followed, including
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three practice lotteries which participants completed as individuals. Then participants
were informed that they would complete the next segment of the study with an
experimenter-assigned partner as part of a dyad. Each participant would be able to
communicate with their assigned partner by “chatting” (i.e., sharing of text messages) via
an Instant Messenger (IM) window on their screen.

Figure 4. Sample Screen Shot of a Trial in the Risky Choice Task. Dyads
communicated through an Instant Messenger window (lower left), which remained on
screen throughout the experiment. Here, Lottery 1 has two tickets -$200 and -$50, each
of which has a 50% chance of being randomly drawn, resulting in a monetary loss.
Similarly Lottery 2 has two tickets, -$150 and -$100, each of which has a 50% chance of
being the outcome in a random draw of this loss lottery.
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Dyads were instructed to use generic names (e.g., “ExpComp6”) pre-assigned by
the experimenter to maintain anonymity. Dyads were encouraged to discuss their
thoughts and reasons behind their impressions of one or the other lottery, and to “explain
in details why you think a particular lottery is better than the other.” Dyads were also told
that they must reach an agreement prior to choosing a lottery on the computer. In reality
though each participant could select whichever lottery they preferred. (In practice, there
was only one occasion in which a participant failed to select the lottery that the dyad had
agreed to choose.)
Both the Risky Choice and the Risk Management task involved 23 decision trials.
Figures 4 and 5 show sample screenshots for lottery presentations in the risky choice task
and risk management tasks respectively.
Risky choice task. On each trial in the risky choice task, a pair of lotteries was
presented on the screen. Each dyad then shared their impressions back and forth via IM
about which lottery to choose until an agreement was reached. Then each individual
responded by clicking on the button beneath the preferred lottery consistent with that
agreement. Then the next lottery pair appeared, signaling the next trial.
Risk management task. In the risk management task, only one lottery was
presented on the screen in each trial. Participants’ task was to improve the outcome value
of one of the two lottery tickets by $50. Dyad partners shared their impressions with one
another via IM regarding which ticket to improve until an agreement was reached. Then
each individual clicked on the agreed-upon ticket, which increased the face value of that
potential outcome by $50 (and moved the ticket one column to the right on the lottery
display). If the dyad selected the lower ticket to improve, the resulting lottery
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corresponded to the low risk lottery (i.e., risk averse choice) from the comparable trial in
the risky choice task. If the dyad selected the higher ticket to improve, the result
corresponded to the high risk lottery (i.e., risk seeking choice).

Figure 5. Sample Screen Shot of a Trial in the Risk Management Task. Dyads
communicated through an Instant Messenger window (lower left), which remained on
screen throughout the experiment. The lottery has two tickets -$50 and $50, Each ticket
has a 50% chance of being randomly drawn. In this task, one of the two tickets can be
moved to the next higher value on the number line. Moving the low ticket results in a less
risky lottery with outcomes of $0 and $50, whereas moving the high ticket results in a
riskier lottery with outcomes -$50 and $100.
After completing the 23 trials of the decision making task, each participant
independently answered a set of five open-ended questions presented on their computer.
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These questions were designed to explore their thoughts and feelings regarding the nature
of the task and experience of working with another person.
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Results
Data from the four studies were combined and analyzed using Repeated Measures
Analysis of Variance feature of SPSS (PASW – Version 18) in a 2x2x4 (Decision Maker
[individual, dyad] x Task [risky choice, risk management] x Outcome Valence [all
negative, mixed negative, mixed positive, all positive]) factorial design. Decision Maker
was a between-subjects variable representing whether the decisions were being made by
an individual or a dyad. As mentioned before, the data for dyads were collected as part of
the Master’s thesis, and compared to existing data for individuals (which were collected
previously by Schneider, Hudspeth, & Decker, manuscript in preparation). Task was also
a between-subjects variable; some of the participants completed the Risky Choice task
and the remainder completed the Risk Management task. Outcome Valence was a withinsubjects variable with 4 levels: all negative (NN, losses), mixed negative (MN), mixed
positive (MP) and all positive (PP, gains). The dependent variable measure of Risk
Preference was defined as the number of times out of six that the riskier option was
selected over the safer one.
Analysis revealed a significant main effect of outcome valence (See Figure 6) on
risk preference, F(3, 540)=55.07, p<0.05. The pattern of preferences does not clearly
follow either PT or SP/A theory, though it has aspects of both. Consistent with prospect
theory, there seems to be slightly more risk taking on average for loss lotteries than gain
lotteries, especially in the mixed conditions. However, consistent with SP/A theory, risk

42
preferences were generally on the cautious side; a risk seeking majority was not observed
in any condition.
Neither the main effect of Task or Decision Maker was significant. Decision
preferences for both the risky choice (M=2.53, SD=1.91) and the risk management
(M=2.27, SD=1.96) tasks were neutral or slightly on the cautious side,F(1, 180)=1.32,
n.s. Similarly, overall, individuals (M=2.49, SD=1.91) and dyads (M=2.17, SD=1.98)

Effect of Outcome Valence on Risk Preference
6
Risk Seeking

Outcome Valence

Risk Preference

5
4
3
2
1

Risk Aversion

0
All Negative

Mixed
Negative

Mixed
Positive

All Positive

Outcome Valence

Figure 6. Effect of Outcome Valence on Risk Preference
engaged in similar levels of risk taking, F(1, 180)= 2.69, n.s. Although the main effects
were not significant, the impact of these variables was evident in interactions.
The Outcome Valence x Task interaction was significant, F(3, 540)=49.7, p<0.05.
(See Figure 7). As expected, there was a cross-over interaction. In the risky choice task,
preferences were risk averse for gains, whereas preferences were slightly risk seeking for
losses. The decision preference pattern in risky choice was consistent with Prospect

43
Theory’s Value Function. Notably though, degree of risk seeking in the negative domain
was at best modest. For risk management, the picture was consistent with SP/A theory
predictions. Preferences tended to be risk averse for all outcome conditions except for
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Figure 7. Effect of Outcome Valence and Task on Risk Preference
lotteries that guarantee some gain. There, participants were more willing to take a risk,
though still not clearly on the side of majority risk taking. Follow up tests demonstrated
that differences in risk preferences for the two tasks were statistically significant at every
level of outcome valence.
The Outcome Valence x Decision Maker interaction was also significant, F(3,
540)=3.33, p<0.05. As can be seen in Figure 8, the overall pattern of risk preferences was
similar at most outcome valences for individuals and dyads. The one exception was for
the all negative lotteries, which imply loss of some amount for sure. When faced with
this situation, dyads tended to take fewer risks than individuals, and pairwise comparison
revealed that this difference was statistically reliable, F(1, 182)=8.31, p<0.05. For the
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other three outcome valence conditions, risk preferences between dyads and individuals
were not significantly different. Thus, overall, it appears that dyads’ are more cautious
than individuals in conditions in which losses are guaranteed, but there was little
evidence of systematic differences elsewhere.
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Figure 8. Effect of Outcome Valence and Decision Maker on Risk Preference
There was no Task x Decision Maker interaction, F(1,180)=0.13, n.s.; nor was
there a three-way interaction of valence, decision maker, and task, F(3, 540)=0.94, n.s..
As can be seen in Figure 9, patterns confirm the two-way interactions observed for
outcome valence x task and outcome valence x decision maker. Risk preference patterns
appear roughly consistent with Prospect Theory predictions for risky choice (Figure 9a)
and roughly consistent with SP/A Theory predictions for risk management (Figure 9b).
Dyads and individuals made similar decisions except for guaranteed losses in both tasks,
when dyads were less willing to take risks.
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Fig. 9a. Risky Choice Task
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Figure 9. Effect of Outcome Valence, Task and Decision Maker on Risk Preference
Thus, the overall pattern of results suggests some support for Prospect Theory,
particularly for the risky choice task, and some support for the SP/A Theory, particularly
for the risk management task. There was also some evidence that making decisions with
a partner influences willingness to take risk, but only when losses were involved.
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Discussion
The present work explored the processes of risky decision making in individuals
and dyads to see whether dyad decision might be subject to social or situational
influences. Evidence was examined for the possibility of risky versus cautious shifts, or
for group polarization effects. Two different tasks were used in order to see whether
changes in the decision context would produce different risk-taking strategies. The
standard passive risky choice task was expected to engage shallower, psychophysical
processes, whereas the active risk management task was expected to enlist more selfrelevant motivational and dispositional processes.
As predicted, the risky choice task led to preferences consistent with prospect
theory, and the risk management task led to preferences consistent with SP/A theory.
Thus neither perspective could predict overall preference patterns, but each of the two
theoretical perspectives was successful in a different task setting. There was also some
evidence of the role of social influences in that dyads tended to be more conservative
than individuals in their decision behavior when dealing with undesirable outcomes. So a
cautious shift was observed, but only for lotteries involving losses. Theoretical
implications of these findings are discussed next.
Psychophysical Influences on Risky Decision Making
Prospect Theory Value Function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) predicts a risk
preference pattern of risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses. Additionally
losses are likely to be experienced as stronger compared to gains of comparable values.
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Also for both outcome valence domains, marginally decreasing sensitivity would be
expected. Overall, in the present work, Prospect Theory predicted results for Risky
Choice for both individuals and dyads. However, Prospect Theory’s psychophysical
explanations could not successfully account for risk decision preferences exhibited by
individuals and dyads in the risk management task.
It appears that for the passive risky choice task, the psychophysical and perceptual
aspects of Prospect Theory are sufficient to predict behavior patterns. Change of
reference from gains to losses appeared to influence participants in the Prospect Theory
predicted direction such that they were generally risk averse for gains and risk seeking for
losses, though not as risk seeking as might be expected.
Further evidence of psychophysical influences can be found in subtleties of the
risky choice preference pattern across outcome valences. Decreasing marginal sensitivity
predicts that reactions should get smaller as outcome value differences move away from
zero. Careful review of Figure 7 shows that participants exhibited higher degrees of risk
aversion and risk seeking respectively when responding to mixed lotteries for gains and
losses compared to sure gains and sure losses. Because the outcomes in the all negative
and all positive conditions were further away from zero, this decrease in sensitivity to
outcome differences may have weakened risk propensities.
Thus, it seems that a relatively peripheral level of processing may be adequate to
make passive choices between given alternatives. However, preference patterns for the
risk management task were markedly different, and could not be understood based on
Prospect Theory’s psychophysical predictions. This could be because the nature of the
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risk management task required a greater engagement of mental processes bringing into
focus motivational and dispositional considerations.
Dispositional and Motivational Influences on Risky Decision Making
The Security-Potential/Aspiration Level Theory (Lopes, 1987) predicts an overall
risk averse behavior pattern for most individuals. Dispositionally, most people are
expected to be more inclined towards security (valuing safety more) though some may be
more inclined toward potential (valuing opportunities more; Schneider and Lopes, 1986).
According to Lopes, when that sense of security is threatened, most people would avoid
risk.
SP/A Theory also considers the impact of a situational factor, aspiration level, on
risky decision behavior. On occasions in which no threat to security is experienced,
aspiration levels might be raised, and the individual could potentially aim for something
better than the sure thing, or the comparable outcomes, choosing in favor of the riskier
alternative. In situations of loss, risks will typically be avoided, with a few exceptions
involving cases in which specific aspirations encourage consideration of the riskier
alternative. In situations in which losses could potentially be avoided (mixed negative),
occasional risk taking may occur in an effort to maintain the possibility of breaking even.
Also, in cases of desperation, people may take risks as the only means of potential
survival. In these cases, Weber and Milliman (1997) have found evidence that people reinterpret the technically riskier option as safer one in these kinds of cases.
This pattern of generally risk-averse preferences was observed for both
individuals and dyads in the risk management task. For positive (gain) lotteries, where
no possibility for loss existed, security was not threatened, and people could potentially
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have placed more weight on raising their aspiration levels, and meeting those levels.
Therefore, compared to other outcome valence conditions, some risk taking was
noticeable for the all positive lotteries. We hypothesized that this task, relative to risky
choice, would be more likely to engage subjects, and thus, to involve motivational and
dispositional processes in addition to psychophysical ones.
Indirect evidence for higher engagement in the risk management task comes from
a preliminary coding analysis of the Instant Messenger conversations between dyad
partners. About one-third of the participants in the risk management task expressed some
concern with financial responsibility (about 60% of which focused on losses).
Statements typically concerned “saving money” or “lowering owed money.” The issue
of financial responsibility was never brought up in the conversations between dyad
partners in the risky choice task. This is probably another indication that the risk
management task, though identical to the risky choice task in terms of stimulus materials,
may have brought into focus motivational factors having to do with action and personal
accountability. The opportunity for manipulating outcome values may potentially have
made participants more aware of their roles in the decision making process, enhancing
motivation and a sense of responsibility for possible consequences.
Social Influences on Risky Decision Making
The risky and cautious shift perspectives predict a shift in group’s (in the present
study, dyad’s) responses in the risky or cautious direction respectively when compared to
individual’s decision preferences. Group polarization concepts on the other hand,
suggest that dyads are likely to exhibit similar patterns of behavior as majority of
individuals; only, for groups, these patterns are likely to be more extreme. This means
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that if majority of individuals were risk seekers to begin with, dyads would engage in
even more risk taking, whereas if individuals were risk averse initially, dyads would
exhibit more pronounced risk aversion tendencies.
Results do not show reliable differences between individual and dyad preferences
in all cases. Only for sure losses, dyads seem to have engaged in significantly less risk
taking compared to individuals. This raises the possibility that when the direct threat to
security was greatest, it became powerful enough in a social context to discourage risk
taking. In terms of cautious shift versus group polarization, we can examine the results to
see which is more likely to have occurred. If security motivation is what is important,
then a cautious shift explanation would be supported.
Given that the preference patterns for risky choice and risk management were
opposite for the all negative condition, where individual-dyad differences were found, we
can readily assess which explanation is most fitting. Individuals exhibited a risk seeking
majority in risky choice, but a risk averse majority in risk management. Group
polarization would predict that the dyads would engage in even greater risk seeking in
risky choice and greater risk aversion for risk management. A cautious shift explanation
would predict that dyads would be more risk averse than individuals in both tasks. The
cautious shift explanation was supported because, as Figure 9 shows, the dyads were less
willing to take risks in the all-negative condition for both tasks. This is consistent with
the possibility that security motivation tended to be stronger in interacting dyads than it
was for individuals. Nevertheless, this cannot explain why dyads were not more risk
averse overall.
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Marquis and Reitz back in 1969 obtained similar findings in a study the effects of
uncertainty and group discussion on individuals’ willingness to take risks. Marquis and
Reitz (1969) found cautious shifts, but only for negative expected values (comparable to
losses. However, they also found a risky shift for positive expected values (comparable
to gains). Both of these findings are consistent with an SP/A explanation. Perhaps with
more power, this type of pattern would also have been observed in the current study.
The conversational data are also somewhat supportive of a security-based
description of dyad-individual differences. A preliminary coding analysis of the Instant
Messenger conversations showed that dyad participants, in general, tended to talk more
about losses than anything else. They also exhibited much concern with worse outcomes,
and this was particularly evident in the risk management task. All negative lotteries
presented decision situations where participants experienced a combined impact of both
undesirable outcomes. Therefore, it is possible that dyads felt most vulnerable in these
situations involving all negative lotteries, and wanted to reduce the unpleasant experience
of threat by avoiding risk, as best as they could, given the circumstances.
One interesting point made by some participants came at the end of the study,
when all participants were asked to respond to several questions regarding their
experiences about working in dyads. In response to a question about whether the
individual participant would have made decisions differently had they been working
alone (as compared to working as part of a dyad), some of them brought up the point of
experiencing some concern for the partner’s welfare. One sample comment was: “…
since I had a partner, I tried to think of him/her so he/she wouldn't lose money and
act[ed] more conservatively”. Thus, when working in a dyad context, participants
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expressed discomfort with risking the loss of other people’s money. This could be one
reason why many participants when working as a dyad tended to err on the side of
caution rather than risk in the negative domain.
Limitations and Future Directions
This thesis provides an initial exploration into situational and social influences on
decision making. In the future, these variables might be combined into one larger formal
experiment with random assignment of participants in order to replicate these findings
with greater control of extraneous variables. In addition, recruiting larger samples of
participants would afford additional statistical power to reliably document effects of
moderate size, especially given the necessity to exclude participants who do not show a
basic understanding of probabilities or lotteries.
Future studies might benefit from including a priori measures of risk attitude or
dispositions. However, the current findings suggest that this may not be as
straightforward as some might imagine. We found that risky decision making patterns
differ with situations, suggesting that an individual may not have a single overarching
risk attitude or disposition that transcends situations. For example, an individual may
have conservative views towards financial investments and yet be an adventure sports
enthusiast, indicating that risk dispositions may vary with respect to different domains or
situations in real life. In addition, even the interpretation of riskiness may not always be a
point of agreement across individuals, or between researchers and participants.
Future research comparisons might also go beyond individual versus dyad to
include other comparisons that could bring in teams and/or groups of different types and
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sizes. Exploring different types of social interactions as well as different settings for those
interactions may be key to understanding real world decision making.
Finally, the present work suggests the need for an overarching theory to connect
the gap between psychophysical, motivational, dispositional and social (not to mention
cognitive) processes to successfully predict general patterns of risky decision behavior
across decision situations and social settings. One promising direction has been taken in
dual process perspectives of decision making. It has been increasingly accepted by
decision theorists and researchers that risky decision making processes may involve two
different systems of processing of information (Damasio, 1994; Epstein, 1994; Evans,
2010; Finucane, Peters, & Slovic, 2003; Hogarth, 2001; Kahneman, 2003; Lieberman,
2000; Reyna, 2004; Stanovich & West, 2000). One system is hypothesized to involve
relatively superficial processes, which are heuristic-based and involve easy or automatic
rules for quickly responding to familiar situations. The other system involves deeper
conscious processes, which are analytical in nature and involve a systematic evaluation of
the decision situation. The nature of task situations may play a role in determining how
these systems interact, and therefore influence both the decision process and resulting
behavior.
The risky choice task, for example, may be one situation in which heuristic
approaches may be sufficient to make risk-related decisions, whereas the risk
management task may be a situation in which a different heuristic or a more analytical
approach is needed. There may be many different default heuristics depending on the
type of decision situation, assuming that the situation feels familiar. For unfamiliar
situations, a more analytic approach may be needed (e.g., Stanovich & West, 2000).
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Social situations may place additional constrains on decision strategies. In real life, there
are many different kinds of decision situations that are likely to be more or less familiar.
Determining how the tradeoff between these two systems occurs may help us resolve
when these different theories may come into play. Advances in neuroscience are likely to
be particularly informative in making progress along these lines.
Decision researchers may sometimes seem to forget that in real life, we often
make decisions with different people in different sets of circumstances and that these
characteristics define decision situations. A comprehensive understanding of human
decision making processes requires sensitivity to the many different kinds of social and
contextual influences that may be at work in different decision situations.
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